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Abstract 
 
Purpose: This study examines the relationship between management diversity and firm 
performance in the case of women in top executive jobs and on boards of directors. 
Corporate governance literature argues that board diversity is potentially positively related to 
firm performance. This hypothesis is tested in the paper. 
Methodology: By the use of data for the 2500 largest Danish firms observed during the 
period 1993–2001 various statistical models for firm performance are specified and 
estimated. The main focus in the models is the estimated relationship between the proportion 
of women in top management (CEO’s and on boards of directors) and firm performance. 
Findings: The results show that the proportion of women in top management jobs tends to 
have positive effects on firm performance, even after controlling for numerous characteristics 
of the firm and direction of causality. The results show that the positive effects of women in 
top management strongly depend on the qualifications of female top managers. 
Originality: This paper provides solid statistical evidence of the effects of women in top 
management on firm performance. The use of a large sample and the panel nature of the data 
set make it possible to properly control for direction of causality and, furthermore, numerous 
firm and individual information are included to estimate genuine effects of women in top 
management. 
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work. We also thank two anonymous referees, Laura Rondi, CERIS-CNR, Torino, and other 
participants at the 6th Workshop on Corporate Governance and Investment held in Palma de 
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1. Introduction 
During the latest decade, there has been an increasing focus on the gender of top 
executives and boards of directors of firms. The proportion of women reaching top positions 
is still very low in most countries, though it has been increasing in for instance the US and in 
some European countries. Some governments, like in Sweden and Norway, have even 
introduced regulations of the gender composition of the boards of directors of private firms in 
order to improve equal opportunities. In Norway, the government has decided that for large 
Norwegian firms at least 40% of the members of the boards of directors must be women in 
2005. This seems to have had a major impact on the recruitment practices for Norwegian 
board members, see Hoel (2005). According to Hoel, the proportion of women in Norwegian 
listed firms increased from about 6% in 2000 to 22% in 2005.  
Parallel to this discussion, focus has been on good corporate governance in many 
countries (see for instance for the US TIAA-CREF (2004) and for Denmark Nørby Johansen 
et al. (2001)). One of the aspects of good corporate governance is management diversity, i.e. 
a heterogenous composition of top managment. If it is actually the case that more women (or 
minority groups) as top executives or members of boards of directors have a positive effect 
on shareholder value and firm performance, this may be a strong argument for having more 
women in top management.  
In this study, we analyse whether female top executives and women on boards of 
directors have any significant effect on firm performance measured by alternative 
performance measures. The study examines the relationship between management diversity 
and firm performance for the 2500 largest Danish firms observed during the period 1993–
2001. Management diversity is defined as the proportion of women among the highest 
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ranking CEOs in firms and on boards of directors. We estimate various panel data models of 
firm performance and control for factors that are traditionally found to affect firm 
performance e.g. firms’ age, size, sector, export orientation. We find that after controlling for 
these observed factors, the proportion of women among top executives and on boards of 
directors tends to have a significantly positive effect on firm performance. A large part of this 
effect is attributed to the female managers with the best qualifications in terms of education, 
and for the female board members it appears that the ones representing the staff have the 
largest positive impact on firm performance. However, when controlling for unobserved 
firm-specific factors, the effect often turns insignificant. This may reflect that until now very 
few Danish firms have had women at the CEO level, and thus panel estimates of the 
performance effects of female CEOs are determined with a large statistical uncertainty. An 
alternative explanation may be, that the relatively few firms who hire women at the top level 
of their organization are firms which are also doing well on a number of other unmeasured 
characteristics (for instance good working conditions and work environment, a more 
focussed recruitment policy etc.).  Another crucial issue is the direction of causality (i.e. do 
women on boards really affect firm performance or is it actually the case that better 
performing firms are more likely to hire women?). Therefore, tests for causality between the 
gender proportion on boards of directors and firm performance are performed. We find that 
the positive relationship is due to board diversity affecting firm performance, not the 
opposite.  
 
2. Theoretical considerations and earlier findings  
 4 
There are a number of arguments in favour of diversity of board members to be found 
in the previous literature, see for instance Bantel and Jackson (1989) and Murray (1989). 
Carter et al. (2003) list 5 positive arguments from a ‘business case perspective’ and also 
discuss management diversity in a principal agent framework. Among the arguments pro 
management diversity is that a more diverse board of directors (or executive board) is able to 
make decisions based on the evaluation of more alternatives compared to a more 
homogenous board. Women directors may have different experiences from their working life 
and non-working life compared to men. They may have a better understanding than men of 
some of the segments of the market place of the firm, and this may improve the creativity and 
quality of the decision making process of the board, see Singh and Vinnicombe (2004). A 
more gender diverse board may also improve the image of the firm and in this way have 
positive effects on firm performance and shareholder value if the positive image has positive 
effects on customers’ behaviour. Another argument for aiming at a more diverse composition 
of board members is that if only male individuals are potential candidates for the boards, the 
selection of board members will take place from only this selected distribution of 
qualifications, and on average this implies a much lower quality than if the candidates are 
selected among the best from the distribution of both men and women (or include minority 
groups). Furthermore, women in top management positions may have positive effects on the 
career development of women at lower levels within the organizations through mentor and 
role models effects. Women at senior levels may affect positively the career aspirations of 
younger women in lower positions, see Ely (1990), Burke and McKeen (1996), and Bell 
(2005). This may increase firm productivity directly and more indirectly through a larger 
pool of potential candidates for top positions in the firm.    
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However, there may also be arguments against management diversity. If a 
heterogenous board produces more opinions and more critical questions, this may be time-
consuming and may not be as effective as a more homogenous board of directors, especially 
if the firm is operating in a highly competitive environment where the ability to react quickly 
to market shocks is an important issue. A culturally, ethnically or gender diverse board may 
experience more conflicts, and even though the decisions may have a better quality in the 
end, this may not balance the negative effects of a more slow decision-making process if the 
market place of the firm demands quick responses, see Hambrick et al. (1996). Thus, based 
on theory, the answer concerning the financial effects of management diversity and women 
on boards is undetermined a priori.  
Predictions from the previous empirical evidence are ambiguous. Most of the 
empirical studies have been based on US data,1 and most of the studies include only the 
largest firms. Shrader et al. (1997) analyse the 200 largest US firms and they are unable to 
find any significantly positive relationship between the percentage of female board members 
and firm performance (measured by return on assets, ROA, and return on equity, ROE). They 
even find significantly negative relations in some cases. Kochan et al. (2003) also find no 
positive relations between gender diversity in management and firm performance for US 
companies. Contrary to these findings, Catalyst (2004) and Adler (2001) find positive 
correlations between ‘female-friendly’ US Fortune 500 firms and the performance of these 
firms.2 Carter et al. (2003) also find a significantly positive effect of the percentage of 
                                                 
1 Carter et al. (2003) give a survey of the empirical results for the US.  
2 Catalyst (2004) defines ‘female friendly’ firms as the Fortune 500 firms which are ranked in the top 25% of 
the distribution with respect to proportion of women among 5% earners or in top management. The proportion 
is calculated as an average during the 5 year period 1996-2000.  Average firm performance among upper 
quartile firms is compared to average firm performance among the least female friendly firms in the bottom 
quartile. Adler (2001) defined ‘female friendly’ firms as the top 25 Fortune 500 firms with the highest ‘score’ 
with respect to employing women as top managers during the period 1980-1998. 
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women and minorities on boards of directors and firm value after controlling for a number of 
other factors which may affect firm value. The study by Carter et al. (2003) also controls for 
the direction of causality by estimating an instrument variable model (IV-model), see below.  
Only very few studies from outside the US exist on this topic. Du Rietz and 
Henrekson (2000) analyse firm performance and women on boards for a sample of Swedish 
firms. They find that if not controlling for firm size and sectors, firms with women on the 
board seem to under-perform. However, when controlling for these factors, the under-
performance hypothesis could not be confirmed. A recent Norwegian study by Böhren and 
Ström (2005) finds a significantly negative relationship between gender diversity (proportion 
of women among board of directors) and firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) in 
Norwegian listed non-financial firms observed during the period 1989-2002. For Denmark, a 
study by Rose (2004) finds a negative, but insignificant relationship between the percentage 
of women on the boards of directors and firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q). The 
study by Rose is based on cross section data for the 116 largest listed Danish firms. Thus, his 
study is based on a quite small sub-sample of the firms included in the analysis presented in 
this paper.   
Thus, the conclusion from the previous empirical studies is ambiguous. Besides the 
ambiguous theoretical predictions, the diverse empirical evidence may be due to different 
estimation methods. In some studies, no controls for other factors are included. For instance 
size and age of the firm (which are factors known to affect firm performance) may correlate 
with the percentage of females on boards, and thus it may blur the picture if not controlled 
for. Further, there may be a number of other unobserved factors which are important for firm 
performance, but which will perhaps never be observable for the researcher. Therefore, panel 
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data where the same firms are observed in a number of years may give a more reliable 
picture than cross-section studies based on only one year of observation.  
A further problem with many of the existing studies is that the samples used are 
typically only based on the largest (listed) firms for which it is possible to get reliable 
information. Therefore, the results may not be representative for all firms in a given country. 
Finally, it is important to control for the direction of causality. If well-performing firms 
decide to employ more women (or minorities) because they decide on a more risky strategy 
with respect to recruiting board members, the observed relationship between a gender diverse 
board and firm performance will tend to become positive. If this is the case, causality may 
run from performance to management diversity and not the reverse. 
 
3. Data and methods 
In this study, we aim at overcoming a number of the weaknesses by using a rather 
unique data set based which is fairly large, compared to many earlier studies. Further, we 
have information on the same firms during a a number of years and thus we are able to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity among firms which may affect some of the earlier 
estimates of the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance.  
3.1. Sample description 
The data set is an unbalanced panel of the 2500 largest Danish firms observed during 
the period 1993-2001. Since Denmark is a small country and since there are few large firms 
in Denmark, this means that our sample include fairly small firms. The average firm size in 
the sample is 219 employees in 2001. The data set is based on register information from 
Statistics Denmark who collects information for all Danish firms on a number of firm 
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characteristics for administrative purposes. Data includes extensive information on the firms 
and the characteristics of the board members and thus allows us to use panel estimators and 
control for causality. The information on firms is merged with individual information on the 
employees of the firm, including information on background characteristics of the CEOs and 
their spouses (spouse information is used in the statistical analysis to control for reverse 
causality between firm performance and gender diversity). However, since Statistics 
Denmark does not collect information on for instance board memberships, the information 
from administrative registers has been merged with information from a private Danish data 
register KOB (Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau). KOB collects information on 
economic performance, board members of the firms etc. based on annual company reports to 
the authorities. These reports are publicly available. KOB collects and harmonises this 
information.   
            The sample is selected from the administrative registers as the 3000 largest Danish 
firms, defined by gross turnover of the firms during each of the years 1993–2001. We 
exclude companies with extreme values, defined as either a negative value of net capital or 
an extreme relationship between firm’s revenue and employment in order to get rid of 
holding companies etc. This means that the effective sample is reduced to about 2300-2500 
firms for each of the years. For some of the variables, for instance membership of board of 
directors, information is only available for the latest part of the period (1996–2001). Since 
the sample is unbalanced, firms which are close to the cut-off criterion of being among the 
3000 largest Danish firms may drop out of the sample in some years.3 The sample consists of 
                                                 
3 A potential problem using unbalanced panel data is that firms are entering and leaving the data set and that 
these changes are likely not to be random. Firm exits depend on performance, which potentially may depend on 
the gender composition of the board. In order to analyse this potential problem, we have calculated the sample 
proportion of women in top management for exit and entry firms and tested whether this proportion was higher 
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listed as well as non-listed firms. In Denmark, there are approximately 300 listed firms. The 
selection criterium implies that most of these firms are selected into the sample. However, 
most of the firms included in the data are not listed firms. Consequently, this data set is much 
broader and more representative compared to the samples used in many other studies of 
women in management.   
3.2. Variable measurement 
 Four alternative measures on firm performance are available in the data. We use all 
four alternative measures in the analyses in order to test the robustness of our results: 
1. Gross profit/net sales   
2. Contribution margin/net sales  
3. Operating income /net assets  
4. Net income after tax/net assets  
 
Gross profit/net sales and contribution margin/net sales are both approximations of 
firms’ markup. Gross profit is measured as net turnover (net sales) minus input expenses 
(cost of good sold). Contribution margin is defined as net sales minus variable costs. 
Consequently, both measures relate to firms’ basic activities. Operating income is defined as 
the net result of the firm taking into account deductions and financial payments, but not 
inclusive extraordinary revenues and expenses.  
In Denmark, the management of private firms is organized as a two tier system. The 
board of directors which is chosen by the stockholders typically consists of external board 
members (except for staff members representing the employees of the firm, see below). The 
chairman of the board (president) is also usually an external member, i.e. the CEOs are 
                                                                                                                                                       
for exit and entry firms than for firms who stayed in the sample during all years. We did not find any significant 
differences in the female proportion for entry and exit firms compared to firms who stayed in the sample. The 
results presented in Tables 3-9 do not change much when restricting the sample to a balanced panel which 
includes only about half as many observations as the unbalanced sample.  
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usually not formally members of the board of directors. In family owned firms, the 
organization of the management is often different. Here, the top CEO (often member of the 
owners’ families) may also be chairman of the board of directors. Further, it is very common 
that the board of directors consists of mainly members of the owners’ families.  
In order to measure gender diversity in management, we apply a number of alternative 
measures of gender diversity in management. The most restrictive definition includes only 
the proportion of women among the top CEOs in the firm.4 However, as a large proportion of 
Danish firms have only one top CEO, we also introduce a broader definition of management 
including vice-directors.  
Further, we have information on the proportion of women on the boards of directors. 
According to Danish law, a number of board members are selected among the staff in firms 
with more than 35 employees. The number of staff representatives depends on the size of the 
board. Traditionally, the proportion of women among the board members who represent the 
staff is larger than among other board members. In some of the estimations, we distinguish 
between the two types of board members.  
In order to control for other factors, which may affect firm performance, a number of 
other variables are included in the analysis. Firm size is measured by the number of 
employees, i.e. performance is expected to be positively related to firm size, because larger 
firms normally have more market power, Bain (1951), Smirlock et al. (1984). Younger firms 
are expected to have smaller earnings than older ones, because they have less experience in 
the market, are in a phase of building up their market position, and they normally have 
relatively higher capital costs as compared to older firms, see e.g. Lipczinsky & Wilson 
                                                 
4 The measure which includes only top CEOs is defined as Disco 1, 12, 121 according to the occupational codes 
applied by Statistics Denmark, while the category ‘top CEOs plus vice-directors’ also includes Disco 122 and 
123.  
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(2001). However, older firms may become more lax or be at a point on their product life 
cycle with declining earnings. Thus, it may be argued that the effect of firm age is an inverse 
U-shape. We also control for the export orientation of the firm. Firms that are heavily 
engaged at export markets (high export/turnover rate) operate in potentially larger markets, 
and this is expected to affect their profits positively. In line with other studies, we control for 
potential effects on profit due to entry barriers for the concerned industry by using a measure 
of the minimum efficient scale (MES) to the market (industry) size, where MES is 
approximated by the first quartile firm’s turnover within the particular industry (measured at 
the 4-digit level).5 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows mean statistics for the variables included in the data set. Note that due 
to missing information, the number of observations varies for each variable. The reported 
number of observations is the maximum number for the sample. The data is divided into two 
groups: Firms with at least one female top CEO and firms without any female top CEOs.  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
From the table it is seen that firms having at least one female top CEO also have a 
higher fraction of women in the lower ranks and also in the boards of directors. Thus, there 
seems to be firms that are more “female-friendly” than others.  Considering the means of the 
four performance measures, there is a tendency of firms with female top CEOs doing worse 
than firms with no female top CEOs in 2001. There is substantial variation in the proportion 
of female managers across industries. Some industries (primary sector, energy and water) 
                                                 
5 MES is calculated by using the total sample of Danish firms which is approximately 25000 firms. 
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have no firms with a woman among their top CEOs or vice-directors, while other industries 
are more ‘female-friendly’ like private service and retail, hotel and restaurants. This clearly 
indicates substantial industry differences and that this is likely to affect the estimation results. 
From Table 1 it appears that mainly older firms and firms with more employees tend 
to have female managers. However, strong conclusions should not be drawn from these 
simple descriptive statistics, since other characteristics are not controlled for.  
Figure 1 shows the development during the period 1993–2001 in the proportion of 
women among top CEOs and on boards of directors for all the firms included in this study. In 
2001, 4.3% of the top CEOs in the largest Danish firms were women. When extending the 
top management category to include vice-directors, this figure increases to 10.9%. The 
proportion of women on boards of directors was 9.7% when including staff representatives 
and 7.9% when excluding staff representatives.  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
The female proportion among CEOs has been slightly increasing during the 1990s 
from 2.5% in 1993 to 4.3% in 2001. When including vice-directors, the proportion of women 
in management has almost doubled, from about 6% in 1993 to 11% in 2001. However, the 
female proportion on boards of directors has declined. It decreased from about 12% in 1996 
to less than 10% in 2001. The decline is mainly due to a relative reduction of female 
members of boards of directors who are not representing the staff. One explanation may be 
that due to the ethics of good corporate governance, still fewer family members are members 
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of boards of directors, and this may have reduced the proportion of women. Our data does 
not allow us to test this hypothesis. 
It is difficult to compare with other countries because of different definitions of top 
management and variations in the samples selected. But the figures above seem to be 
relatively low, see Table 2. The Danish figures based on the sample used in this study include 
many relatively small firms. According to Table 1, the average firm size in the Danish 
sample was 219 employees in 2001. If only the 113 largest firms in the sample are 
considered, the proportion of females among top CEOs was slightly higher (5.9%) in 2005, 
see Table 2. However, this is still much lower than in the US Fortune 500 firms where 10.2% 
of the top CEOs were women in 2000. In Norway and Sweden, the proportion of women in 
boards of directors has risen dramatically the latest years, clearly as a reaction to government 
regulations in Norway, see Hoel (2005).   
(Table 2 about here) 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Basic estimations 
In general, the statistical model of firm performance can be written as, 
(1)   1 2 3_ _it it it it itP X W CEO W boardβ β β ε= + + +  
where i refers to the firm, and t is time. itP  is a performance measure. As described in the 
data section, four performance measures are applied: Gross profit/net sales, Contribution 
margin/net sales, Operating income /net assets and Net income after tax/net assets. 
_ itW CEO and _ itW board  are the key variables of this study, i.e. the proportion of women 
in management, measured as (1) Top CEOs, (2) Top CEOs plus vice-directors, (3) Members 
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of boards of directors . Hence 2β and 3β are the parameters of primary interest. itX  is a vector 
of other explanatory variables typically assumed to affect firm performance, i.e. firm size 
(number of employees), firm age (years since establishment, potential market size (measured 
by the export-intensity of the firm))6 and an indicator of entry barriers (minimum efficient 
scale). In addition, we add controls for industry and year of estimation in order to deal with 
changing business conditions. εit is an error component, assumed  to be Nid(0,σε2). 
Since we have a panel of firms, we are able to control for time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity which may bias the results from cross-section studies if these unobserved 
factors correlate with the proportion of female CEOs. Thus, we also present random and 
fixed effects models of Pit. The panel version of equation (1) is: 
(2)   1 2 3_ _ ( )it it it it i itP X W CEO W boardβ β β α ε= + + + +  
where αi is the unobserved heterogeneity term, assumed to be firm-specific and time-
invariant. The random effects estimator is only valid if αi is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables. We test the validity of the random effects estimator by a Hausman test. As shown 
below, the Hausman test tends to reject the random effects estimator and thus the fixed 
effects results are preferred. 
The fixed effects estimator is consistent, but it does not give any estimates on 
variables which are time constant. Further, for variables with a small variation, the estimates 
are imprecise (has a large variation) and therefore results tend to become insignificant due to 
small variation across time. The key variable in this study, the proportion of women in 
management, suffers from this problem. Therefore, we first present estimation results from 
pooled estimations of (1), see Table 3, where selected key results of pooled ordinary least 
                                                 
6 The estimation forms allow for non-linearity by including squared expressions for firm size and age, see the 
theoretical discussion above.  
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squares (OLS) regressions based on the sample of firms observed during the period 1993 (or 
1996 for board of directors estimations) to 2002 are presented.7 For each of the four 
performance measures, we have estimated four alternative models, including a number of 
explanatory control variables as described above (firm size, firm age etc.) plus the 
proportions of women in top management and the share of women on boards of directors.8 In 
the first row of Table 3, the effect of a female top CEO is shown, the second row of results 
shows the coefficients of the female proportion among top CEOs and vice-directors, the third 
row shows the coefficients including the variable proportion of women on boards of 
directors.  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
The first group of results concerns the effect of female top CEOs. In general, the 
estimated coefficients are positive, but except for column 1 (gross profit/net sales) no 
significant effects are found. However, extending the definition of top management to 
include vice-directors, the estimated coefficients turn significant for three out of four firm 
performance measures. Thus, when controlling for firm size, sector, age of firm etc., we find 
that there is a positive performance effect of female CEOs for Danish firms.  
Turning to the female representation on boards of directors, the results are more 
mixed. When including a variable measuring the proportion of women among all board 
                                                 
7 Due to space considerations we do not show the full estimation results for all the models in this paper. The full 
estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
8 For different reasons, we do not include both W_CEO and W_board in the same regressions but estimate their 
effects in separate regressions. Firstly, W_board is only observed for a sub-period, i.e. the years 1996-2001. 
Second, we are not able to instrument both variables when controlling for reverse causality, and thirdly, the two 
variables are correlated, i.e. we have problems of multicollinarity, see correlations coefficients in Appendix. 
Thus, the ‘total effect’ of women in top management is not the sum of the two estimated effects.  
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members, there is only one positive and significant coefficient found (contribution 
margin/net sales) while the coefficient for some performance measures is negative, though 
insignificant. 
In order to control for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity, which may affect firm 
performance, we have also estimated alternative panel data models. Table 4 shows the results 
from fixed effects and random effects estimation the model. The reported Hausman tests 
reject the random effects model in all cases; i.e. the random effects parameters are likely to 
be biased from correlation between the firm-specific effects and the explanatory variables. 
Therefore, the preferred panel data specification is the fixed effect model. As expected, the 
level of significance drops considerably when moving from the pooled OLS to the fixed 
effect estimation. This may be the result of a very small variation in the explanatory 
variables, including the key variables on female proportions in top management or 
measurement errors which reinforce the problems of getting significant coefficients. An 
interesting result is the significantly negative coefficient for the variable representing female 
proportion among board of directors in Columns 1-2. The interpretation of this result is 
discussed further below.  
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
 4.2 Direction of causality. 
The direction of causality between firm performance and the proportion of women in 
management has been widely discussed. Thus, according to this discussion some firms may 
be observed to have a high proportion of female CEOs because these firms are currently 
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doing well and may be able ‘to take the risk’ of employing a female CEO. If this is the case, 
the direction of causality is the reverse in relations (1)–(2), i.e. profitable firms have 
relatively more female managers than less profitable firms. In order to deal with problems of 
potential endogeneity in equations (1)–(2), we estimate the models by the use of an 
instrument variable approach (IV). The proportion of women in management in the firm is 
then estimated by the following equation: 
(3)    1 2_ it it it itW CEO X Zα α ν= + +  
where Xit is a vector of firm characteristics inclusive firm performance, itZ are the 
instruments, i.e. factors affecting the proportion of women in management, which at the same 
time do not affect firm performance, and νit is an error component, assumed to be Nid(0,σν2). 
Since _ itW CEO  is a proportion, 0≤ _ itW CEO ≤1, a linear specification of (2) is inappropriate. 
Therefore, (3) is estimated by a tobit estimator which takes into account the upper and lower 
limits of the dependent variable, _ itW CEO .     
It is a well-known problem to find valid instruments, i.e. Z-variables. This is also 
difficult in this context because there are no obvious variables included in our data set which 
clearly explain female proportion in top management without being suspected to influence 
the observed firm performance. We have tested more variables related to firm characteristics, 
but these variables did not pass a test of being a valid instrument based on the method 
described in Bound et al. (1995).9 Instead we use as an instrument the average length of 
education of the spouses of the other CEOs in the firm. Our hypothesis is that CEOs who are 
married to well-educated spouses (in most cases these are wives) are supposed to be more 
                                                 
9In the test proposed by Bound et al. (1995) it is analysed whether the instrument significantly affects the 
proportion of female managers in a firm, but has no direct significant effect on firm performance.    
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positive and have a less traditional view on the competences of female CEOs, implying that 
they are more willing to hire and accept a woman in their own firm as compared to other 
CEOs who are married to lower educated spouses. Furthermore, the education of the spouse 
is assumed not to affect the firm performance. The test by Bound et al. (1995) cannot reject 
that the instrument is valid. However, we are only able to apply an IV-estimator in the 
models analysing the effects of female CEOs. We do not have individual information on 
board members since the information on board members does not stem from Statistic 
Denmark’s administrative registers. Thus, we do not have valid instruments for the 
regressions where _ itW board  enters. 
In Table 5, the estimates for panel versions of the IV-models are presented. As the 
previous results show that the fixed effect model is strictly preferred to the random effects 
model, only models in which the second step is estimated as pooled OLS and fixed effects 
estimation are presented.  
 
(Table 5 about here) 
 
The results in Table 5 confirm the results presented previously. The estimates from 
IV-pooled OLS show positive, significant relationships between female CEOs and 
comparing to the results of Table 3 (pooled OLS, no IV) the introduction of IV to the pooled 
OLS generates larger and more significant positive effects of women in management. 
However, the results from IV-fixed effects models are again insignificant. Thus, our results 
document, that when controlling for causality, there is still a positive effect of female top 
CEOs and vice-directors. As in Table 3, the size of the effect is larger for the broader group 
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including vice-directors comparing to the effect observed for only top CEOs. One 
explanation of this evidence may be that the relatively large increase in Denmark during the 
period 1993-2001 in female proportion of vice-directors reflects that still more highly 
educated women are now potential candidates for being promoted into top-management due 
to their qualifications and professional skills. Older female top CEOs may to a larger extent 
have been selected due to family ties to the owners’ families. We will pursue this hypothesis 
below. 
Though we are able to reject a hypothesis of reverse causality in our study, it is 
important to stress that the interpretation of our results is not as straightforward as it might 
seem in first instance. Since we find significantly positive coefficients in the pooled OLS 
estimations, but insignificant panel estimates (fixed or random effects), this may reflect that 
the firms who have succeeded in hiring female top managers are the firms with the most 
ambitious/progressive/active characteristics in general. If there exist unobserved 
characteristics of this type in the firm, which are (almost) time constant during our 
observation period, this may at the same time explain that more women are hired in top 
management. For instance firms with an explicit management diversity policy or, in general, 
a more ambitious recruitment policy may also in other respects have characteristics not 
observed (good working environment, high degree of team spirit etc.) which explain firm 
performance and profits.    
4.3. Qualification effects 
In the previous analysis, we have not looked at the qualifications of female managers, 
i.e. the estimated effects are average effects for all women in top management. However, the 
estimated effects potentially conceal variations in effects of qualifications of the female 
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managers. The hypothesis is that the positive effect of women in top management is larger, 
the more qualified the female managers are. If many of the women who are observed as top 
managers in our sample were mainly selected back in time because they were for instance 
widows or daughters of the owner(s) and not because of their formal qualifications relevant 
for a position as a top manager, the estimated coefficients above may not give an adequate 
picture of the potential for a future policy of management diversity and hiring (formally 
qualified) women as top managers.    
In Table 6, the educational distribution of the CEOs is presented. In 1993, 74% of all 
female top CEOs in the sample did not have a formal higher education, while this was only 
the case for 59% of the male top CEOs. These figures change considerably during the 1990s, 
and in 2001 only 46% of female and 44% of male top CEOs had no higher education. The 
proportion of female top CEOs holding a masters degree (long higher education) almost 
doubled, from 17% in 1993 to 32% in 2001, while the same figures for male top CEOs were 
30% and 36%, respectively. Thus, the educational level of female top CEOs has increased 
much faster than that of male CEOs, and the educational gap has narrowed considerably 
during the period. When including vice-directors, the picture changes. Female CEOs at the 
level just below the top CEO are on average as well educated as their male peers. Since the 
broader category of CEOs including vice-directors is younger than the group of top CEOs on 
average, this indicates a development over the period 1993-2001 where Danish female CEOs 
have become still more qualified and have almost closed the qualification gap to their male 
colleagues. 
 
(Table 6 about here)  
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In order to test whether the differences in formal competences matter for the 
estimated performance effects of women in top management, we split the variable W_CEO 
into three variables which measure the proportion of females among the group of CEOs at 
different educational levels 
(4)    _ _ _ & _it it it itW CEO W long W M S W EDU= + +  
where W_longit is the proportion of women among the group of CEOs having at least an 
education at the master level (long higher education), W_M&Sit is the proportion of women 
among the group of CEOs having an education at the BA-level or slightly shorter (short or 
medium higher education),  W_EDUit is the proportion of women among the group of CEOs 
having no education or vocational education. Consequently, we estimate the form:  
(1a) 1 2 3 4_ _ & _it it it it it itP X W long W M S W Otherβ β β β ε= + + + +  
Since there are few females in the group of top CEOs, we only estimate (4) for the 
group of CEOs including vice-directors. The results of these estimations (see Table 7) are 
striking, in the sense that they show that a large part of the performance gain from female 
managers can be attributed to the highest educated women for whom the estimated 
performance effects tend to be much larger than for women with a short or medium higher 
education (except for Column 2, Profit on primary operations). For women with no higher 
education, i.e. women who are either unskilled or have a vocational education, the 
performance effect is larger than for women with a short or medium higher education.10 
                                                 
10 This result may be explained by the fact that short and medium long theoretical educations in Denmark to a 
large extent are educations related to service and education jobs in the public sector (nurses, teachers, care 
workers etc.).  These educations are typical ‘female educations’ which may be very different from educations 
typical for a career in the private sector. One hypothesis might be that women with these types of educations 
who end up as CEOs often have family ties to the owners. We are not able to test this hypothesis because we 
lack information on family ties.    
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(Table 7 about here) 
 
Among the board members, similar mechanisms may play a role. Only limited 
information about the board members is available. However, we do have information on the 
board member status of the individual, i.e. whether the board member is a staff representative 
or not. From Table 8 it is seen that the proportion of females among staff board members is 
substantially higher than among other board members, and furthermore it appears that, 
contrary to the general negative trend of women in the Danish boards, the female share 
among the staff members has increased slightly over the observation period.  
 
(Table 8 about here) 
 
If we assume that women who are selected into the board of directors are as qualified 
as their male colleagues who are staff representatives on the board of directors, and if a 
proportion of female non-staff board members are selected because they have family ties to 
the owners and not because of their educational qualifications, we will expect that a potential 
positive effect of females on boards is larger for female staff members than for female non-
staff members.11   
In Table 9, this hypothesis is tested. The first row of estimates corresponds to the 
estimates for the female board member effects presented in Table 3 where only one small 
positive significant effect was found. When we split the female board member effects, i.e. 
                                                 
11 For the 100 largest Danish firms more than two thirds of all female supervisory board members (excl. staff 
representatives) have family ties to the owners. 
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estimates two separate performance effects for the female proportion on the board, an 
interesting picture emerges: 7 out of 8 estimates are now significant and for the staff 
members of the board the four coefficients are positive and very significant. On the other 
hand, for female non-staff members of the board the effects are significantly negative and 
rather large in two out of four cases. 
 
(Table 9 about here)   
 
Thus, female non-staff members of boards of directors seem to have a less positive or 
even negative effect on firm performance compared to staff members. This finding may 
indicate that firms who employ family members on their board of directors seem to be less 
successful with respect to performance compared to firms who do not.12  
 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the influence of the proportion of women in 
management on firm performance. There is a theoretical as well as an empirical motivation 
for dealing with this issue of corporate governance. In the theoretical section of the paper, we 
argue that board diversity affects the performance of the firm. However, according to the 
existing theory the influence can be positive as well as negative. The empirical motivation 
comes from the increasing focus on the gender composition of top executives and boards of 
directors of firms. The proportion of women who reach top positions in the business sector is 
still very low in most countries, though it has been increasing in some countries. If it can be 
                                                 
12 This corresponds to the results of Bennedsen et al. (2005) who find for a sample of Danish firms that family 
successions in CEO positions have a negative impact on performance compared to non-family successions. 
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shown statistically that more female top executives (or other minority groups) or women on 
boards of directors have positive effects on firm performance, this may be a strong argument 
for having more women on boards.  
Using a sample of the 2500 largest Danish firms over the period 1993-2001, we 
analyse empirically whether the proportion of female top CEOs or members of boards of 
directors really affects firm performance. The conclusion is ambiguous and depends both on 
the measure of performance and the measure of the proportion of women in management. 
The effect on firm performance of a higher fraction of female top CEOs varies from none to 
positive. Performance measures which approximate the mark-up, e.g. gross profit are 
affected more positively and more significantly than the other performance measures, e.g. net 
income after taxes. Furthermore, the results show that the positive performance effects are 
mainly related to female managers with a university degree while female CEOs who do not 
hold a university degree have a much smaller or insignificant effect on firm performance.  
Next, female members of boards of directors elected by the staff seem to have 
positive effects on firm performance. However, this positive effect does not carry over to 
other female board members, where the effect is negative - a result, which may be explained 
by the fact that a significant part of the women on boards have family ties to the owners. 
However, we are not able in this study to identify whether the board members have family 
ties or not. An important topic for future research would be to identify the performance 
effects of female - as well as male board members - who have family ties to the owners. 
The question concerning getting more women on boards and in top executive jobs is a 
highly debated issue in many countries. In Norway, there have already been political 
initiatives regulating the proportion of women among board members. Our results are to 
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some extent supporting the view that a more gender diversity in top management positions 
would improve the financial performance of Danish firms. However, since our results also 
indicate that qualifications are important, it is important that there is a sufficient potential 
pool of qualified women who can fill the positions as board members or who might be 
recruited as top CEOs. Therefore, the main implication from our study is the importance of 
attracting and recruiting more women into the higher ranking positions in firms and thus 
increasing the number women who are qualified to be selected into boards of directors or as 
top CEOs. It may have negative boomerang effects in the longer run if for instance very rigid 
quotas are imposed on the composition of board members.         
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Table 1. Sample means and standard deviations, 1993 and 2001. 
 2001 1993 
 Firms with 
at least one 
female top 
CEO 
Firms with 
no female 
top CEO 
Firms with at 
least one 
female top 
CEO 
Firms with 
no female 
top CEO 
Female Proportion:      
         CEOs  0.499       
(0.300) 
 0.567       
(0.293) 
 
         CEOs and vice-directors 0.292       
(0.204) 
0.063       
(0.154) 
0.357       
(0.269) 
0.036        
(0.114) 
         Board of directors, excl. staff  0.139       
(0.184) 
0.067       
(0.138) 
  
         Board of directors, staff only  0.133       
(0.251) 
0.061        
(0.180) 
  
Firm Performance:     
         Gross profit/net sales 0.353       
(0.189) 
0.305       
(0.213) 
0.398       
(0.200) 
0.325        
(0.208) 
         Contribution margin/net sales 0.036       
(0.101) 
0.045       
(0.106) 
0.042       
(0.058) 
0.045        
(0.078) 
         Operating income /net assets 0.210       
(0.433) 
0.234        
(0.601) 
 0.707       
(1.150) 
         Net income after tax/net assets 0.151       
(0.345) 
0.160      
(0.357) 
0.178       
(0.459) 
0.176       
(0.355) 
Sector(indicator variables, 0/1):     
         Primary  0.0151      
(0.122) 
 0.015       
(0.122) 
         Manufacturing 0.343       
(0.477) 
0.300       
(0.459) 
0.348       
(0.481) 
0.321       
(0.467) 
         Energy and water  0.021        
(0.142) 
 0.006       
(0.078) 
         Building and construction  0.051       
(0.220) 
0.045       
(0.208) 
 0.055      
(0.227) 
         Retail, hotel and restaurants 0.374       
(0.486) 
0.402        
(0.490) 
0.391       
(0.493) 
0.384        
(0.486) 
         Transportation, telecommunication etc. 0.040       
(0.198) 
0.050       
(0.219) 
0.043       
(0.206) 
0.044       
(0.205) 
         Private service 0.192       
(0.396) 
0.166       
(0.373) 
0.217       
(0.417) 
0.175      
(0.380) 
Age of firm (year) 40.040      
(37.482) 
32.693      
(32.981) 
43.690     
(25.886) 
38.415      
(32.802) 
Number of employees 626.061       
(1644.250) 
201.498     
(609.022) 
352.175     
(684.714) 
154.332     
(427.710) 
 Export(indicator variables, 0/1)::     
         Low (less than 10% of turnover)  0.242       
(0.431) 
0.324       
(0.468) 
0.413       
(0.498) 
0.555      
(0.497) 
         High (more than 50% of turnover) 0.737       
(0.442) 
0.659       
(0.474) 
0.261       
(0.444) 
0.203       
(0.402) 
Min. efficient scale relative to market size 
(MES = quartile turnover in industry, 4-digit) 
8.433       
(1.334) 
8.566       
(1.351) 
7.873       
(0.914) 
7.925       
(0.962) 
Number of firms 99 2,380 46 2,108 
The number of observations included in the last row is the maximum number of firms in the year concerned. 
For some of the variables there may be fewer observations than this number. Firms with extreme values for the 
performance variables have been excluded from the sample.   
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Figure 1. Proportion of women in top management and on boards of directors, 1993-2001. 
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Table 2. Proportion of women in top management (CEO) and on boards of directors, 
selected countries.  
 
Country 
 
CEO 
 
Board of directors  
US, Fortune 500 firms, 2000 (CEO)/2002 (board of 
directors ) 
10.2%1) 13.6% 
Sweden, 2002, large firms (sales > SEK 50 million) 
Sweden 2005 (178 largest firms)  
5.2% 
15.0% 
12.0% 
18.7% 
Norway, 2001, firms > 250 employees (CEO) and 
listed firms (board of directors ) 
Norway, 2005 (97 largest firms)  
4.5% 
 
12.4% 
6%  
 
21.6% 
Denmark, 2001,  2500 largest firms (sales), this study 
 
Denmark, 2005 (113 largest firms) 
4.3% 
 
5.9% 
9.7% (incl. staff) 
7.9% (excl. staff) 
11.7% 
1) A broader definition of top CEO is used than the one used for Denmark. 
2) Weighted average calculated on the basis of 380 and 109 firms who had, respectively had not, answered a 
survey on board membership. Information based on Hoel (2004, p. 13). 
Source: US, Catalyst (2003, 2004), Sweden, Henrekson (2004) and Hoel (2005), Norway, Likestillingssenteret 
(2001) and Hoel (2004, 2005), Denmark, Hoel (2005).  
 
 
 31 
 
Table 3. Estimated coefficients of alternative variables reflecting proportion of women in 
management (β2 and β3). Pooled OLS, 1993-20011).  
  
Dependent variable: Firm performance 
 
 
 
 
Gross profit/net 
sales 
Contribution 
margin/net sales 
Operating income 
/net assets 
Net income 
after tax/net 
assets 
Top CEOs 
1993-2001 
 
0.063* 
(0.012) 
 
0.162 
18,862 
0.006 
(0.004) 
 
0.034 
18,862 
0.051 
(0.034) 
 
0.022 
14,554 
 
0.032 
(0.022) 
 
0.019 
18,862 
Top CEOs  
and Vice-directors 
1993-2001 
0.094* 
(0.009) 
 
0.170 
18,862 
 
0.003 
(0.003) 
 
0.034 
18,862 
0.092* 
(0.027) 
 
0.024 
14,554 
0.072* 
(0.016) 
 
0.020 
18,862 
Board of directors  
1996-2001 
0.011 
(0.011) 
 
0.160 
12,085 
0.012* 
(0.004) 
 
0.034 
12,085 
-0.051 
(0.031) 
 
0.022 
12,080 
-0.032 
(0.021) 
 
0.018 
12,085 
* Denotes that the estimated parameter is statistically different from 0 at the 5% level of significance.  
1) Values in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated parameters, Adj R2  is reported in row 3, and row 4 
includes the number of observations in each regression analysis.   
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Table 4. Estimated coefficients of alternative variables reflecting proportion of women in 
management (β2 and β3). Fixed- and random effect estimations, 1993-20011). 
  
Dependent variable: Firm performance 
 
 Gross profit/net sales 
 
Contribution 
margin/net sales 
Operating income 
/net assets 
Net income after 
tax/net assets 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Top CEOs 
1993-2001 
 
0.020* 
(0.006) 
 
0.036 
18,862 
 
 
0.023* 
(0.006) 
 
0.029 
18,862 
1417.5 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
 
0.017 
18,862 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
 
0.015 
18,862 
97.2 
-0.022 
(0.039) 
 
0.023 
14,554 
0.005 
(0.035) 
 
0.022 
14,554 
45.6 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
 
0.014 
18,862 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
 
0.013 
18,862 
68.5 
Top CEOs  
and  
Vice-directors 
1993-2001 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
 
0.036 
18,862 
 
 
0.005 
(0.005) 
 
0.028 
18,862 
2677.1 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
 
0.017 
18,862 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
 
0.015 
18,862 
100.4 
-0.019 
(0.034) 
 
0.023 
14,554 
0.022 
(0.023) 
 
0.021 
14,554 
48.2 
-0.013 
(0.020) 
 
0.013 
18,862 
0.017 
(0.017) 
 
0.012 
18,862 
75.1 
Board of 
directors, all  
1996-2001 
 
-0.029* 
(0.010) 
 
0.062 
12,085 
 
 
-0.024* 
(0.009) 
 
0.050 
12,085 
565.4 
0.002 
(0.006) 
 
0.018 
12,085 
 
0.003 
(0.005) 
 
0.015 
12,085 
60.0 
0.015 
(0.053) 
 
0.021 
12,080 
 
-0.017 
(0.039) 
 
0.019 
12,080 
39.1 
-0.009 
(0.037) 
 
0.017 
12,085 
 
-0.014 
(0.026) 
 
0.015 
12,085 
39.7 
* Denotes that the estimated parameter is statistically different from 0 at the 5% level of significance.  
1) Values in brackets are standard errors of the estimated parameters, Adj. R2  is reported in row 3, and row 4 
includes the number of observations in each regression analysis. The values reported in row 5 are Hausman Chi-
square test for systematic differences in estimated coefficients.  
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Table 5. Estimated coefficients of alternative variables reflecting proportion of women in 
management (β2). IV-estimations, 2nd step:  pooled OLS and fixed effect estimations, 1993-
2001. Instrument: mean educational level of managers’ wives1). 
  
Dependent variable: Firm performance 
 
 Gross profit/net sales 
 
Contribution 
margin/net sales 
Operating income 
/net assets 
Net income after 
tax/net assets 
Pooled 
OLS 
 
FE Pooled 
OLS 
FE Pooled 
OLS 
FE Pooled 
OLS 
FE 
Top CEOs 
1993-2001 
0.088*   
(0.008) 
 
0.157 
17105 
 
-0.005   
(0.006) 
 
0.038 
17105 
0.013*    
(0.003) 
 
0.035 
17105 
-0.003   
(0.003) 
 
0.019 
17105 
0.074*  
(0.023) 
 
0.021 
13132 
-0.051   
(0.035) 
 
0.024 
13132 
0.043* 
(0 .014) 
 
0.017 
17105 
-0.043    
(0.023) 
 
0.014                          
17105 
Top CEOs  
and Vice-
directors 
1993-2001 
 
0.365*   
(0.032) 
 
0.157 
17105 
-0.019   
(0.024) 
 
0.038 
17105 
0.053*   
(0.012) 
 
0.035 
17105 
-0.014   
(0.015) 
 
0.017 
17105 
0.306*  
(0.095) 
 
0.021 
13132 
-0.210   
(0.143) 
 
0.024 
13132 
0.177*   
(0.059) 
 
0.017 
17105 
-0.178  
(0.094) 
 
0.014                          
17105 
* Denotes that the estimated parameter is statistically different from 0 at the 5% level of significance.  
1) Values in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated parameters, Adj R2 is reported in row 3 and 
number of observations in row 4.   
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Table 6.  Educational level among female and male CEOs. 1993 and 2001.1) 
 1993 2001 1993 2001 
 Top CEOs Top CEOs and Vice-directors 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
 
Long higher 
education 
(master) 
 
0.174 0.298 0.315 0.358 0.239 0.228 0.289 0.309 
Medium or short 
higher education 
(bachelor) 
 
0.087 0.113 0.226 0.206 0.094 0.049  0.159 0.136 
No higher 
education 
. 
0.739 0.589 0.459 0.436 0.667 0.723 0.552 0.556 
All 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
No. of obs. 46 1020 99 1142 345 1322 641 1408 
1) Long higher education is defined as 8 years or more after compulsory schooling. This typically means a 
masters degree from a university. Medium or short higher education is 6-7 years of higher education after 
compulsory schooling (bachelor or others), while no higher education is either vocational training or no other 
completed qualifying education. 
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Table 7. Estimated coefficients on effects of proportion of women in management, top CEOs 
and vice-directors (β2). Pooled OLS, 1993-20011,2). 
  
Dependent variable: Firm performance 
Proportion of 
female CEO 
with: 
Gross profit/net 
sales 
 
Contribution 
margin/net sales 
Operating income 
/net assets 
Net income after 
tax/net assets 
Long higher 
education 
(master) 
 
0.283*     
(0.028) 
 
 
0.009      
(0.010) 
 
 
0.148 
(0.085) 
 
 
0.121* 
(0.053) 
 
Medium or short 
higher education 
(bachelor etc.) 
 
0.014*     
(0.006) 
 
 
0.000 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.029 
(0.019) 
 
 
0.017 
(0.012) 
 
No higher 
education 
 
-0.026*     
(0.003) 
 
 
0.003 
(0.013) 
 
 
0.069* 
(0.010) 
 
 
0.045* 
(0.006) 
 
Adj. R2 
Nr. of observations 
0.168 
18862 
0.036 
18862 
0.026 
14554 
0.022 
18862 
* Denotes that the estimated parameter is statistically different from 0 at the 5% level of significance.  
1) See note 1 in Table 6. 
2) Values in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated parameters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
Table 8. Proportion of women among members of boards of directors including and 
excluding staff members. 1996 and 2001 
 1996 2001 
Board of directors, all 
 0.117 0.099 
Board of directors, excl. staff  
 0.101 0.080 
Board of directors, staff only 
 0.194 0.207 
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Table 9. Estimated coefficients of effects of proportion of women among members of boards 
of directors  (β3). Pooled OLS, 1996-20011).  
  
Dependent variable: Firm performance 
 
 
 
 
Gross profit/net 
sales 
Contribution 
margin/net sales 
Operating income 
/net assets 
Net income 
after tax/net 
assets 
Board of directors, 
all 
1996-2001 
 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.160 
12,085 
 
0.012* 
(0.004) 
0.034 
12,085 
-0.051 
(0.031) 
0.022 
12,080 
-0.032 
(0.021) 
0.018 
12,085 
Board of directors,  
excl. staff 
1996-2001 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
0.171 
12,085 
 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.038 
12,085 
-0.079* 
(0.031) 
0.029 
12,080 
-0.061** 
(0.021) 
0.026 
12,085 
Board of directors, 
staff only 
1996-2001 
0.038* 
(0.010) 
0.171 
12,085 
0.014* 
(0.004) 
0.038 
12,085 
0.065* 
(0.028) 
0.029 
12,085 
0.063* 
(0.019) 
0.026 
12,085 
* Denotes that the estimated parameter is statistically different from 0 at the 5% level of significance.  
1) Values in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated parameters, Adj R2 is reported in row 3 and 
number of observations in row 4.  
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Appendix: Pearsons correlation coefficients for key variables, 2001. 
 
 
 Gross 
profit/net 
sales 
Contribution 
margin/net 
sales 
Operating 
income 
/net assets 
Net income 
after tax/net 
assets 
Proportion.of  
women 
among top 
CEOs 
Proportion of. 
women among 
top CEOs and 
vice-directors 
Proportion 
of women in 
boards of 
directors 
Gross profit/net 
sales 1.0000 0.3611 0.0341 0.0569 0.0533 0.1110 -0.0313 
Contribution 
margin/net sales 0.3612 1.0000 0.2921 0.3656 -0.0151 0.0148 -0.0264 
Operating income 
/net assets 0.0341 0.2921 1.0000 0.7602 -0.0002 -0.0152 -0.0154 
Net income after 
tax/net assets 0.0569 0.3656 0.7602 1.0000 0.0092 -0.0153 -0.0002 
Proportion of 
women among 
top CEOs 
0.0533 -0.0152 -0.0002 0.0092 1.0000 0.4570 0.1407 
Proportion of 
women among 
top CEOs and 
vice-directors 
0.1101 0.0148 -0.0152 -0.0133 0.4570 1.0000 0.0599 
Proportion of 
women among 
boards of 
directors 
-0.0313 -0.0264 -0.0154 -0.0002 0.1407 0.0599 1.0000 
